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The Good Friday agreement put to rest age-old conflicts on Ireland. It
also offered hope that the reunification of Cyprus might be possible within
the European Union. But lately, as Stavros Zenios writes, the “Green
Line” that divides the easternmost island of the EU is viewed as a
template for a soft border at the westernmost island of the Union after
Brexit.
European nations can sure find better ways to resolve political questions than turning for
answers to the last divided capital of Europe. The Green Line is a war zone, and I was
once stopped by UN peacekeeping troops when I inadvertently rode my bicycle into the
demilitarised buffer zone behind the University campus. It is hard to see the Green Line
delivering what Northern Ireland needs.
Nevertheless, this template is being discussed. The UK Government
position paper refers to Cyprus as an example.  A working paper from the Brexit Policy
Institute “points to the Cyprus model” for the “free movement of goods”. Nikos Scoutaris
of the European University Institute suggests that the legal arrangements
accommodating the Cyprus situation could offer some inspiration if Northern Ireland (and
Scotland) wish to remain in the EU. On the other hand, Michel Barnier, the EU chief
negotiator, suggests that the solution for the border between Northern Ireland
and Ireland cannot “be based on a precedent”.
In this blog, I review the desideratum of Northern Ireland and the Green
Line arrangements, and explain why these arrangements cannot work for Northern
Ireland. I point out two significant asymmetries between the two islands.  While the
Cyprus experience has something to offer, it does not provide a template, nor should it.
The desideratum of Northern Ireland
The Prime Minister’s Article 50 letter articulates the UK position:
We must pay attention to the UK’s unique relationship with the Republic of Ireland and the
importance of the peace process in Northern Ireland.  The Republic of Ireland is the only
EU Member State with a land border with the United Kingdom. We want to avoid a return
to a hard border between our two countries […]
This deference to the status quo is most likely welcome by all actors. However, unilateral
flexibility is insufficient. The border will be subject to EU regulations on the one side and
UK regulations on the other. An agreed reciprocal arrangement is needed to ensure that
the border is as seamless and frictionless as possible. That’s where the Green Line
enters the discussion.
1/6
Green Line flexibility
While the Republic of Cyprus territory covers the whole island, the northern part is under
Turkish military control since the events of 1974. When the country joined the EU in May
2004, the application of the acquis was suspended in the areas where the Government
does not exercise effective control.  The Green Line separating the north dates to the
hostilities between the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities in 1964, when a
British officer marked with a green pencil the cease-fire line through the capital city of
Nicosia. With the advance of the Turkish army in August 1974, the line was extended
180Km from the west to the east coast, with a buffer zone patrolled by UN Blue Berets.
The Green Line is not considered as an external border of the EU, and Council
Regulation 866/2004 defines the terms under which provisions of EU laws apply to the
movement of goods and persons. This is known as the Green Line regulation.
The Regulation adopts “special rules concerning the crossing of goods, services and
persons, the prime responsibility for which belongs to the Republic of Cyprus.  As these
areas are temporarily outside the customs and fiscal territory of the Community and
outside the area of freedom, justice and security, the special rules should secure an
equivalent standard of protection of the security of the EU with regard to illegal
immigration and threats to public order, and of its economic interests as far as the
movement of goods is concerned. “The Government is required to “carry out checks on
all persons crossing the line with the aim to combat illegal immigration”.
These excerpts present the hard side of the Regulation. There is a kinder, gentler, side
that encourages trade between the north and the areas where the Government exercises
effective control. Goods validated by the Turkish-Cypriot Chamber of Commerce as
originating at the north can cross freely the line. It is this flexible provision that inspires
potential arrangements for Northern Ireland.
Regarding persons, EU citizens and third-country nationals who are legally residing in
the northern part of Cyprus can cross the line. So does anybody who enters the island
through the Government controlled areas. But what happens to those entering the
northern part of the island through Turkey? The Regulation states that “while taking into
account the legitimate concerns of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, it is
necessary to enable EU citizens to exercise their rights of free movement within the EU
and set the minimum rules for carrying out checks on persons at the line and to ensure
the effective surveillance of it, in order to combat the illegal immigration as well as any
threat to public security and public policy.”
This masterpiece wording of creative ambiguity. EU citizens who enter the island through
the north can cross the Green Line by showing an ID card or passport. Third country
nationals are, in general, denied entry.  Why this distinction? EU residents can enter
freely the island, and the fact that they may have arrived through Turkey is not used
against them. Third country nationals need to obtain an appropriate visa and have it
checked at a legitimate port of entry.  The Government does not wish to relegate control
of its borders at Green Line crossing points.
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The Regulation asks “the Commission shall report to the Council on an annual basis […]
on the implementation of the Regulation and the situation resulting from its application”.
 From these reports, we can monitor the experience over the last 14 years (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Illegal immigration and smuggling across the Green Line, and the
crossing of persons across the Green Line and the Ireland-North Ireland border.
Note: Data for illegal immigration, seized products,  and crossings of persons
across the Green Line from Commission reports. Crossings in Ireland for 2006
from the Centre for Cross Border Studies and for 2017 from FactCheckN.
and linearly interpolated in between.
The Green Line is not so green
While flexible, the Green Line is far from being the soft border required for Northern
Ireland.   There is a small number of “official crossing points” where Republic of Cyprus
police enforces the Green Line regulation. Similarly, Turkish-Cypriot “authorities” —the
“Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” unilaterally declared its independence in 1983, but
is recognised only by Turkey— exercise, in general, symmetric controls for persons and
goods crossing from the Republic controlled territories.
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Why is a hard border unavoidable? Leaving aside the complexity of the military conflict
with Turkey, one significant goal is to stem illegal immigration from the north. Even with
strict police controls and fenced up the buffer zone and military patrols across the line,
there has been significant leakage.  The number of irregular migrants is reported in
Figure 1. While illegal crossings are less than 0.5% of the legal crossings, the leakage is
significant for an island with a population about 1 million. To put these numbers in
perspective, Cyprus was slated to receive a maximum of 300 Syrian refugees, and the
illegal immigration across the Green Line is more than five times this quota.
The official crossing points also serve for verifying that goods transported are produced
in northern Cyprus and can be traded without duties. Turkey, that enjoys free trade with
the north of Cyprus but is not EU member, cannot export its products to the EU through
the Green Line.  However, smuggling of goods remains widespread. The reports of the
Commission reveal very little trade across the Green Line (4–5mil EUR per annum), but
also seizures of smuggled goods (Figure 1).   A report by Sapienta Economics reveals
much higher consumer spending (33.5mil.  EUR in 2016), which is about .15% of the
combined GDP of the economies on both sides of the divide.  Smuggling is mainly due to
price differentials and the higher tax on tobacco products in the Republic of Cyprus.
There is also smuggling of agricultural and animal and dairy products, and products
violating intellectual property rights. All trade is intra-island.
The Green Line model for Ireland
The flexible arrangements of the Green  Line for the movement of goods, prompted the 
Brexit Policy Institute to propose empowering the Northern Ireland Executive to identify
goods as originating in Northern Ireland  (and not simply travelling through  Northern
Ireland from the UK or a third country). The EU could allow these certified goods to enter
the EU market via the Republic of Ireland and to be treated as EU goods.  This
arrangement could indeed work, although certificates would need to be checked at
“official crossing points”.
How would the UK reciprocate? According to the Brexit Policy Institute:
The  UK  could allow such  [certified]  goods enter the UK market as “domestic goods”,
and this would allow the UK to present this arrangement as a symmetrical one.
This is hardly a reciprocal arrangement with the EU, it is more like eating your cake and
having it too. A reciprocal arrangement will require products originating in the Republic
of Ireland to cross freely into Northern Ireland and the UK. And this raises some hard
questions:
1. Could the Northern Ireland Executive discriminate against
products not produced in Northern Ireland, according to UK law?  Possibly
yes, and the Executive will be willing to do it to promote Northern Ireland
exports to EU markets.
2. Could the Republic of Ireland discriminate against products originating in other EU
member states? Most likely not, and the Government would rather be unwilling to
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make special efforts for a small trading partner.
A practical reciprocal arrangement would be to treat all EU products entering Northern
Ireland from the  Republic of Ireland as domestic goods. But such an arrangement will
be a back door entry for EU products into the UK.
Furthermore, if the UK wishes to “take back control of its borders”,  as one of the
objectives of Brexit, it cannot avoid the hard feature of the Green  Line when dealing with
crossings of persons. Only an agreed reciprocal arrangement that anyone
in the Republic of Ireland can cross into Northern Ireland, and conversely, will render
a hard border unnecessary. But such an agreement will be a back door entry of EU
citizens into the UK.
If anybody harbours hope that the Green Line template could still serve Northern Ireland,
let us not forget the scale differences between the two islands. Crossings of persons and
goods across Northern Ireland-Ireland border is an order of magnitude bigger than
crossings across the Green Line.
Table 1.
Note: Data on Northern Ireland trade with the  Republic of Ireland from
Bruegel and authors calculations. Trade and persons crossing the Green Line
using data from the Commission report for 2016 and authors calculations.
Persons crossing the Irish border from FactCheckNI.
Asymmetries between the cases of Northern Ireland and Cyprus
Some aspects of the Green Line regulation relating to goods could indeed provide
inspiration for a Northern Ireland border post-Brexit. However, such arrangements
require official crossing points, which everybody agrees should be avoided in Northern
Ireland. This salient point is conspicuously absent when the Green Line is invoked as a
model.
There are two significant asymmetries between the cases of Northern Ireland and
Cyprus. These are worth bearing in mind, as they delineate what the Green Line
template could and could not achieve.
First, the Republic of Cyprus is a member of the EU and the Green Line regulation allows
part of its territory not under  Government control to enjoy membership benefits. The
interlocutor of the EU is a member state.   In the case of Northern Ireland,  arrangements
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are sought for a territory that will be under the control of a non-member state (UK). There
will be no member state interlocutor, and the EU will have to deal with a region. The case
of Cyprus is easier in this respect.
Second, north Cyprus does not have officially recognized State authorities.
Arrangements that require a sovereign —such as customs control,  issuance of drivers
licenses, and vehicle roadworthiness certificates—  can not be worked out between the
Republic of Cyprus and the north.    The situation between the UK and Northern Ireland,
and the Republic of Ireland is easier in this respect.
Setting a good example
Where does this discussion lead us? The hope that Green Line can be a role model is, in
our opinion, misplaced. No country divided by force, and staying divided for 43 years,
can be a role model. The Green Line is an example of exceptionalism that needs to be
normalized, not to become the norm. There may be consensus on the desiderata for
Northern Ireland, but they cannot be achieved using the Green Line model.
If the UK and the EU show sufficient imagination to find a solution, that could become a
template for Cyprus. But making the Green Line of a divided Cyprus the template for
Ireland will create more problems than it will solve. It will be going backwards.
____
Note: This article was originally published on Bruegel.
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